A new case for naval arms control

This paper opens with an examination of existing legal restraints on naval forces and arms control agreements and concludes that the U.S. is already heavily engaged in naval arms control. Given the new international security environment and the new U.S. regionally-oriented national security and military strategies, the author then recommends a series of additional naval arms control measures that should be taken: exchanges of data, transparency, INCSEA, cooperative measures, an agreement on the laws of submarine warfare, abolishing NCND, no first tactical nuclear use at sea, NWFZs, advanced notification of operational-level exercises, environmental protection measures, controls over maritime technologies, armed escorts of nuclear shipments, new Roes, PALs, the resolution of outstanding political issues at sea, deep cuts in nuclear forces, CFE follow-on, limits on specific types of naval forces, geographic limits, expanded standing naval forces, and a re negotiation of the ABM Treaty. The paper then addresses verification and compliance issues. Author concludes that since the U.S. Navy has already managed to avoid major arms control while balanced on the precarious 'slippery slope', there is no reason to continue its stonewalling policies.