Issue-based constraints on electoral accountability for the repeal of term limits

Fifteen U.S. states currently limit the number of terms state legislators can serve in office. Although incumbents almost universally object to term limits, lawmakers in most states have been reluctant to act on their preferences out of concern they will be held accountable on an issue that is generally popular with constituents. This dissertation assesses the validity of those concerns by presenting and testing a theory of electoral accountability for cases when legislators take actions that deviate from their constituents' preferences on term limits. Augmenting our current theory of accountability on noneconomic issues, which emphasizes the traceability of the legislative action and public attention to the issue, the theory presented here treats accountability as dependent on characteristics of the issue that cannot be manipulated by political actors. This new theory suggests that legislators are overly concerned about the electoral cost of voting to repeal or weaken term limit laws, even when their actions are easily traceable and there is a high level of public attention to the issue. The institutional nature of the term limits issue and the attitudes that motivate voters to support term limits place constraints on the salience of the issue to vote choice and limit accountability to primary election races in districts where constituencies have been substantially disrupted by redistricting. The theory of issue-based constraints is put to three empirical tests. In two states, Idaho and Utah, legislators have risked accountability and repealed term limits from themselves. The project tests for accountability following the 2002 repeal of term limits in Idaho and the 2003 repeal in Utah. In the third test, the project searches for accountability in cases when U.S. Senators and Representatives abandon personal pledges to voluntarily limit their tenure in office. The theory of issue-based constraints is supported by the results from all three tests. The project concludes by considering the lessons for lawmakers and the implications of these findings for how we approach the study of accountability on other non-economic issues, with a focus on the relative weights that voters assign to issues of institutional structure and public policy in their decision making.