Friend and foe

Models of legislative organization--distributive, informational, and partisan--assume forces outside Congress exert little pressure on members to innovate. This logic fundamentally misconstrues the reforming impulse. The theory I offer, therefore, gives center stage to the relationship between Congress and executive. Transaction costs, I contend, make reform rare. Internal efforts, stymied, require a push from outside. Major historical events such as war, economic depression, and "constitutional moments" strain existing institutions to their breaking point. The resulting transformation may take a variety of forms. Capacity-building changes are likely when the state embraces new issues. If time to act is short and interbranch relations friendly, reform aids cooperation between Congress and president. Conversely, conflict spawns innovation bracing legislative independence. After developing my theory, I take it to history (1789-1921). Substantive chapters explore three historical periods--antebellum, Civil War/Reconstruction, and the Gilded Age through World War I. During the "long" 19 th Century, reform attends major events over 70 percent of the time. Innovation is often multifaceted. Consider the Civil War. It brought debate limitations, new policy committees (including Appropriations), and a number of panels intended to superintend executive-led mobilization efforts. Many important changes in congressional organization come after exogenous shocks, and are shaped by the system of separated power.