Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus

"Pyrrhonian skepticism is defined by its commitment to inquiry. The Greek work skepsis means inquiry -- not doubt, or whatever else later forms of skepticism took to be at the core of skeptical philosophy. Sextus Empiricus's writings offer the most sophisticated and detailed version of ancient skepticism in the Pyrrhonian tradition. According to Sextus, skeptics neither claim to 'know nothing' nor hold knowledge to be unattainable. Instead they continue to investigate (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.1-4). Being a skeptic, unlike, say, a Stoic or a Platonist, is not a matter of holding a certain view. It is to engage in ongoing inquiry of a certain sort. This makes Pyrrhonism an enigmatic presence in the history of philosophy. It offers no theories to interpret, no proofs in any ordinary sense to excavate. Pyrrhonism is self-consciously open ended, foreseeing epicycles of objections and replies, arguments and counterarguments in perpetuity. Just as enigmatic is its voice for posterity, Sextus Empiricus (fl. 2nd century CE). While a large quantity of his works survives, assessing his place in the history of philosophy and his relevance for contemporary philosophy is challenging, for it is often difficult to decipher where his sources end and he begins. This volume investigates epistemology after Sextus, both ways in which he has influenced the history of philosophy and ways in which he and the Pyrrhonian tradition he represents ought to contribute to contemporary debates. We aim to (re-)instate Sextus as an important philosopher in these discussions in much the same way that Aristotle has been brought into discussions in contemporary ethics, action theory, and metaphysics"--