Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism

Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism

by Katherine L. Milkman

Part of Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 08-064

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We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism.

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