Allenby's Final Triumph

THIS narrative, it is hoped, will serve to remove the impression which prevails among a not inconsiderable section of the British public that the Army commanded and handled with such consummate skill by Lord Allenby in Palestine had a comparatively simple task... In 1918 General Allenby had to contend with enormous difficulties. He was faced with the problem of having to arrange his operations so as to fit in with the calls made upon him to reinforce the Western Front. At a time when the Turkish moral was still good, he had to send to France the bulk of his veteran British infantry when they were in the highest state of efficiency, and, with new Indian troops in their place, he had to build up another army. In these pages I have tried to show how, while increasing the power of his fresh troops, he forced down the fighting capacity of his enemy, and then, when by a most ably worked out scheme of camouflage he had concealed scores of thousands of men and horses at the place of attack, he launched his host against an army whose moral he had reduced to a low level. By employing a magnificent body of cavalry he gave another lesson to the armies of the world in the employment of the mounted arm, and, uninfluenced by the desires of London and Paris that this or that should be his aim, his own plans, worked out in his own way, secured far more than War Councils or War Cabinets had any right to expect. The Army’s appreciation of Lord Allenby is correct.