Followup audit on recommendations for controls over exporting sensitive technologies to countries of concern

Public Law 106-65, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000," requires the Inspectors General of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State to conduct annual reviews of the transfer of militarily sensitive technology to countries of concern. For the annual review due to Congress by March 30, 2007, these Inspectors General were joined by those of the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Inspectors General decided to follow up on recommendations made from FY 2000 through FY 2006 to improve controls over exports. Each year, the results of the individual agencies' reviews are combined in a report to Congress. The DoD Inspector General made 39 recommendations during FYs 2000 through 2006 to strengthen controls and reduce risks contributing to the inappropriate export of goods, services, and technologies such as chemicals, toxins, electronics, explosives, sensors, and lasers. As of June 28, 2006, DoD organizations had implemented 25 of the 39 recommendations. During this audit, we found four additional recommendations were implemented for a total of 29 recommendations. Therefore, as of December 21, 2006, DoD organizations still needed to implement 10 recommendations. The 10 remaining recommendations request DoD organizations to develop, implement, or revise guidance to determine whether an export license is required; to prevent unauthorized access to or disclosure of export-controlled technology; and to establish roles and responsibilities for persons involved with export-controlled technology. Also, the recommendations relate to analyzing and documenting analysis of export applications; updating export guidance to reflect current organizational titles, responsibilities, and structure; giving users access to the DoD export application system; and developing effective management controls. Until our recommended actions are implemented, DoD continues to accept avoidable risks of inappropriately exporting sensitive goods, services, and technology that could threaten our national security. (See the Finding section of the report for the detailed recommendations.).