Three politcal papers in empirical political economy

This thesis presents three independent essays in applied political economy. The first paper examines the effect of opposition representation on policies adopted by municipal councils in France. The opposition is thought to play an important role in a variety of political institutions, but its impact is generally difficult to measure due to the usual problems with observational studies. In French municipalities, an unusual electoral rule creates a rare natural experiment that I exploit to measure the impact of the opposition's presence on several areas of policy. I find that the opposition tends to moderate personnel spending, a major budget component; the opposition also appears to make decision-making slower, based on an analysis of municipal confederation decisions. The findings suggest that even a relatively powerless opposition can have an impact on policies adopted in a deliberative body. The second paper focuses on lobbying in the U.S. I document and seek to explain the fact that lobbyists who formerly served in Congress tend to attract more business when their party is in power. I focus on two broad explanations, one that emphasizes the advantages to interest groups of hiring lobbyists who are ideologically close to sitting politicians and another that emphasizes the advantages of hiring lobbyists who are personally close to sitting politicians. My analysis of partisan swings in lobbying across issue areas suggests that the ideological explanation applies mostly to former staffers while personal proximity likely better explains the partisan hiring of former members of Congress. The third paper analyzes the estates of recently deceased British politicians to assess the financial rewards that result from being elected to the House of Commons. I compare the wealth of MPs with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost and find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of Conservative MPs but had no discernible financial benefits for Labour MPs. I show that Conservative MPs profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions and suggest that Labour MPs did not profit from office because of the concentrated power structure of the Labour Party.