Essays on public goods provision

This thesis consists of three essays on public goods provision. The first essay presents and tests two alternative models of the economic motivations for corporate philanthropy: a managerial discretion model and a profit maximization model. These theories make distinct predictions that I test using field experiments in corporate fundraising campaigns. In the first experiment, based on a U.S. corporate fundraising campaign, I find support for the managerial discretion model. In a second fundraising experiment in Bulgaria, I present two treatments that allow for the assessment of the relative importance of managerial personal benefit and corporate profit enhancement. The results indicate that both are significant motives for corporate giving. The second essay uses insights from psychology and the methodology of experimental economics to explore the effectiveness of two incentive mechanisms aimed at increasing public goods provision. I present two incentive mechanisms aimed at increasing the contribution rate by decreasing the price of giving: "premium incentive mechanism", modeled by decreasing the amount foregone when contributing, and "matching incentive mechanism", modeled by increasing others' revenue from a unit contributed. Using data from a laboratory experiment, I find that, keeping the price of giving constant, a matching mechanism motivates men more than women to increase their contributions in a public goods game, while a premium mechanism motivates women more than men. The third essay examines challenges with public goods provision in developing countries by focusing on misclassification with the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) in Karnataka, India. The purpose of the TPDS is to allow families living below the poverty line (BPL) to purchase certain commodities at subsidized prices. The BPL card allocation process involves surveying of each household by a government official, usually the village accountant (VA), followed by a verification process by the Gram Panchayat (GP)--the local political elite. We conducted a household survey in the state of Karnataka in order to obtain an independent measure of BPL eligibility and information on demographic characteristics and connectedness to the GP and the VA. We find significant misclassification. Furthermore, we examine the correlates of misclassification and evaluate the impact of an awareness